Mobilization and Trust: What the New Ukrainian Poll Really Shows

June 24, 2026.

    Oleh Spornykov, Rule of law foundation
    Mobilization in Ukraine in 2026 has ceased to be merely a military or administrative issue. It has become one of the main indicators of trust between citizens and the state. That is why the latest Active Group poll, conducted on June 20, 2026 among 1,000 respondents, should be read not as a set of percentages, but as a social diagnosis. And that diagnosis is complex: Ukrainians do not reject the need for defense, but they increasingly distrust the fairness and effectiveness of the current mobilization system.
    This is a very important distinction. Society is not saying that “the army is unnecessary” or that “the war can be won without people.” On the contrary, part of the public still supports strengthening mobilization. At the same time, however, most respondents do not see the current mechanism as sufficiently effective, and they view the Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centers as incapable of ensuring a proper process.
    In other words, Ukrainians are not against defending the state. They are increasingly against chaos, opacity, selectiveness, and the feeling of injustice.
    Strengthening Mobilization: A Divided but Not Indifferent Society
    When asked whether mobilization in Ukraine should be strengthened, only 8.3% answered “definitely yes” in June 2026, while another 20.7% said “rather yes.” Together, this gives 29% support for strengthening mobilization measures.
    At the same time, 22.6% answered “rather no,” and 25.9% said “definitely no.” In other words, almost half of respondents — 48.5% — do not support strengthening mobilization. Another 22.5% found it difficult to answer.
    These numbers are revealing. In September 2023, support for strengthening mobilization was higher: “definitely yes” and “rather yes” together amounted to 36.1%. In June 2026, that figure fell to 29%. Over nearly three years, the share of supporters of stronger mobilization declined by about seven percentage points.
    But something else is even more important: the number of those who are “definitely against” rose from 14.6% in September 2023 to 25.9% in June 2026. This is no longer just fatigue. It is a sign of accumulated irritation connected not only with the war itself, but with the way the state organizes mobilization.
    To put it bluntly but honestly: society is ready for difficult decisions when it sees fair rules. When the rules are unclear, mobilization begins to be perceived not as a shared duty, but as a lottery.
    The Main Problem Is Not Mobilization Itself, but Its Effectiveness
    The answers regarding the effectiveness of mobilization are even more troubling. In June 2026, only 2.9% considered it “fully effective,” while another 17.7% said it was “mostly effective.” In total, only 20.6% of respondents gave mobilization a positive assessment.
    By contrast, 34.1% considered it “mostly ineffective,” and 31.6% called it “completely ineffective.” Together, negative assessments reach 65.7%.
    This is the key figure of the entire poll. Nearly two-thirds of respondents consider mobilization ineffective. And this is not about fear of military service, emotional exhaustion, or reluctance to fight. It is an assessment of state capacity.
    In December 2023, 36.1% considered mobilization completely ineffective; in January 2025, the figure was 38.5%; in June 2026, it stood at 31.6%. The worst peak of distrust has slightly decreased, but the overall negative assessment remains consistently high. Meanwhile, the share of those who consider the system fully effective has remained extremely low, fluctuating between 2% and 6%.
    This means that the state has failed to convince citizens that mobilization has become clearer, fairer, and better organized. Even if some internal changes are taking place, society does not feel them.
    Recruitment Centers as a Symbol of Systemic Distrust
    The harshest assessments concern the Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centers. When asked whether the current system of recruitment centers is capable of ensuring effective mobilization, only 4.6% answered “yes, fully” in June 2026, while another 9.1% said “rather yes.” Together, that is only 13.7%.
    By contrast, 44.3% answered “rather no,” and 31.8% said “definitely no.” In total, 76.1% effectively do not believe that the current recruitment center system is capable of ensuring effective mobilization.
    This is not simply a crisis of one institution. It is a crisis of a symbol. For many Ukrainians, recruitment centers have become not a representation of state fairness, but an image of coercion, unpredictability, bureaucracy, and inequality.
    Here, one must be careful. Recruitment center employees work under difficult conditions, under public pressure, often with staff shortages and within a system tasked with an extremely difficult mission. The problem is not to identify one guilty party. The problem is that the very model of interaction between the state and the citizen in the field of mobilization has proven insufficiently humane, transparent, and modern.
    When three-quarters of citizens do not believe in the capacity of the key mobilization institution, cosmetic changes are no longer enough. A restructuring is needed.
    Has the Fight Against Abuse Begun? A Cautious Signal, but Not a Breakthrough
    A separate question concerns the fight against abuses in recruitment centers and the mobilization system in general. In June 2026, 6.6% believed that such a fight had “definitely” begun, while 15.2% said “rather yes.” Together, that gives 21.8%.
    By contrast, 44.1% answered “rather no,” and 26.1% said “definitely no.” In total, 70.2% do not see a real fight against abuses.
    Compared with May 2026, there is a slight improvement. Back then, 3.5% answered “definitely yes”; in June, that figure rose to 6.6%. The share of those saying “definitely no” fell from 33.1% to 26.1%. This may mean that society has noticed some signals: inspections, detentions, public statements, or personnel decisions.
    But this is clearly not enough. Most people still do not believe that the system is truly being cleaned up. Ukrainians, it seems, no longer respond to the mere announcement of a “fight.” They want to see results: punishment of the guilty, changes in procedures, digital mechanisms, transparent rules, protection of the rights of mobilized citizens, and accountability of officials.
    Society is tired of ritual promises. It wants proof.
    What Lies Behind the Numbers: The War Is Long, Trust Is Not Unlimited
    This poll is also important because it shows a change in the psychology of war. In 2022, Ukrainian society lived in a mode of existential mobilization. There was shock, the threat of state destruction, a powerful wave of volunteerism, solidarity, and readiness to act immediately.
    In 2023, it became clear that the war would be long. In 2024-2025, society entered a phase of exhaustion: the front needed people, the rear needed justice, the state needed resources, and families needed clarity about the future.
    In 2026, we are seeing not the first emotion of war, but a mature, difficult, often painful assessment. People do not deny the reality of the war. But they ask: why do some serve for years while others remain outside the system? Why do rotations appear insufficient? Why do rules on deferments and fitness for service often seem confusing? Why does information about abuses spread faster than information about fair decisions? Why does a person often feel fear rather than respect when dealing with the state?
    These questions cannot be answered only with orders. Mobilization is not only coercion. It is a contract between the state and the citizen. And if the state wants citizens to fulfill the hardest duty, it must fulfill its own: to act honestly, clearly, and responsibly.
    The State’s Mistake: Speaking of Duty While Avoiding Justice
    One of the biggest communication mistakes made by the authorities is that mobilization is often explained in the language of necessity, but not enough in the language of justice.
    Yes, mobilization is necessary. Yes, the army needs reinforcements. Yes, the front cannot hold without people. That is true. But for citizens, that is no longer enough. They want to understand that the system is the same for everyone: for the poor and the wealthy, for villages and the capital, for small entrepreneurs and officials, for students, drivers, managers, members of parliament, and the children of influential parents.
    Fairness in mobilization is not abstract morality. It is a practical condition of defense capability. If people consider the system unfair, they begin to avoid it. If they see it as transparent, they may still not want to go, they may be afraid, they may worry about their families, but the level of social resistance will be lower.
    The state has the right to demand. But the state does not have the right to lose trust.
    What Needs to Change
    First, mobilization must become as digital as possible wherever feasible. Not to make it “easier to catch people,” but to reduce chaos, queues, human error, corruption risks, and arbitrary decision-making.
    Second, Ukraine needs a clear system of rotations and predictability of service. A person should know not only when they may be mobilized, but also under what conditions they may be transferred, demobilized, rehabilitated after injury, or receive support for their family.
    Third, the state must publicly demonstrate that the fight against abuses is not a campaign, but a permanent policy. If there is corruption in military medical commissions, recruitment centers, deferment procedures, or evasion through fake documents, society must see not only scandals, but convictions, dismissals, and changes in procedures.
    Fourth, respect for the person must be restored in the mobilization process itself. Even when the decision is difficult for a citizen, the form of communication matters. Humiliation, rudeness, forceful scenes, opacity, and lack of explanation destroy trust faster than any enemy propaganda.
    Fifth, the state must speak honestly about the needs of the front. Not in general phrases, but clearly: what specialties are needed, what the service conditions are, what guarantees exist, what training opportunities are available, how recruitment works, and why some units are more successful in recruiting than others.
    The Main Conclusion
    The Active Group poll does not show that Ukrainians have rejected defense. It shows something else: Ukrainians want defense to be organized fairly. And that is a very healthy demand for a society that has been living through a major war for more than four years.
    The bad news for the state is that trust in the current mobilization system is very low. When 65.7% consider mobilization ineffective, and 76.1% do not believe that the recruitment center system is capable of ensuring an effective process, this can no longer be dismissed as “emotions” or “information attacks.”
    The good news is that society is not indifferent. People respond, evaluate, compare, and demand change. Indifference would be far more dangerous. The current criticism is not a rejection of the state, but a demand that the state become better.
    Mobilization in Ukraine needs not only strengthening. It needs a reset of trust. Wars are won not only by orders, equipment, and numbers. They are won by systems that citizens trust even when those systems demand the hardest things from them.
    And this is Ukraine’s main challenge today: to make mobilization cease to be a symbol of fear and become part of a clear, fair, and shared defense contract between the state and society.